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Abstract—Applying regular patches is vital for the timely
correction of security vulnerabilities, but installing patches
also risks disrupting working systems by potentially intro-
ducing unknown errors. System administrators must manage
the challenges of patching using a combination of reliance on
best practice and available information to best match their
organizations’ needs. In this work, we study how patch-
related activities are supported by the mailing list of the
website PatchManagement.org which is dedicated to the
task. We qualitatively coded 356 list emails sent between
March and July, 2018, to understand how members interact
with the list community. Based on our results, we argue
that the mailing list is an example of an Online Commu-
nity of Practice, where practitioners engage in communal
learning and support. We find that the community supports
members in multiple phases of the patching process by
providing workarounds before a patch is available, guidance
prioritizing released patches, and helping with post-patch
trouble. Additionally, the community provides help around
tool selection and facilitating discussions.
Index Terms—Human factors, Security usability, Technology
social factors
1. Introduction
Patch management is a difficult task, requiring system
administrators (sysadmins) to have a strong understand-
ing of their system components, obtain good information
about potential patches, and apply them to the systems
without incident. The task is also difficult because of the
unknowns around how a system will react to a patch.
The Meltdown [45] and Spectre [38] patches are
a good example of the security importance related to
updates, as well as the uncertainty as to the outcome
of patching. In January 2018, the two new critical vul-
nerabilities were announced. They affected all modern
processors, allowing malicious programs to access and
read information stored in memory, including memory
used by other programs running on the same processor.
Large vendors, such as Google, Apple, Microsoft, and
IBM quickly released patches (aka updates) to protect
users. The following week, Microsoft was forced to pull
its patches due to users complaining about unbootable
PC’s [67]. Hoax websites also started appearing offering
malware laden Meltdown/Spectre patches [59].
Patching is crucial to security, the majority of com-
promises involve an exploited vulnerability for which a
patch exists, but has not yet been installed [51], [60]. From
a purely security viewpoint, installing patches quickly is
vitally important. Official patch advice, such as the UK
Government’s “Cyber Essentials” scheme recommends
that patches be applied within two weeks of release [1].
Yet, in the wild we still do not see critical patches
being as widely installed as they should be. For exam-
ple, the WannaCry malicious software took several UK
National Health Service trusts offline blocking patients
from accessing health care. The associated patch had been
available for a full two months before the attack, but had
not been installed [53]. Similarly, HeartBleed – a serious
vulnerability that provides anyone with a dump of current
server memory – was still an issue three years after the
patch release as a third of systems had still not applied
the patch patch [39]. Recent work shows that this situation
has not improved [46].
Despite the security positives of patch installation,
sysadmins are still nervous about installing them. Patches
have a long history of coming not only with security
improvements, but also with problems [10]. Code Red, a
computer worm from the early 2000’s, famously featured
a faulty patch solution, followed by a second less faulty
patch which most people installed, and finally a third
good patch that few installed because the second one
mostly worked [52]. More recently, a Windows 10 update
in 2018 created chaos for users when the patch caused
serious data loss by deleting the Documents folder [14].
One of the roles of a sysadmins is to balance the security
needs of patching quickly against the risks of installing
a problematic patch, which can be challenging [12]. A
recent Avast report [2] found that 55% of software was
out of date, raising serious concerns about the nature and
current state of patch management policies, and signalling
to academia that more must be done to understand the
nuances of patch management [24].
Our work aims to expand on the research commu-
nity’s understanding of sysadmins’ information seeking
behaviors around patch management by conducting a
qualitative analysis of the prominent mailing list: Patch-
Management.org. Recent work has indicated that similar
information sources are being used by sysadmins during
the initial stages of assessing a patch [44], and we present
the first analysis of such a data source. This mailing
list is dominated by Microsoft related content, as seen
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in Figure 1, so we provide a contextual focus to the
information shared on the list by narrowing our focus to
that of Windows Update.
In this work, we qualitatively code 356 list emails sent
between March and July, 2018, to understand how the list
community interacts. Based on our results, we argue that
the mailing list is an example of an Online Community of
Practice, where practitioners engage in communal learning
and support.
Our primary questions when analyzing the list were:
• In what ways do contributing members of Patch-
Management.org engage with the list?
• What types of information is shared or requested
by sysadmins in the community?
We find that the PatchManagement.org community
supports members in multiple phases of the patching
process from providing guidance on pre-patch mitigation,
information to support patch prioritization, suggesting
workarounds for error-prone patches, and sourcing infor-
mation on potential errors. We detail the community effort
in contributing advice on tool selection and facilitating
discussions of best practice approaches to patch manage-
ment.
2. Related Work
2.1. SysAdmins and Their Work Practices
Most of what we know about the day-to-day activities
of sysadmins is based on a sequence of ethnographic
studies [4], [6]–[9], [26]–[28], [33], [47] which were later
compiled into a book [34]. The studies show that beyond
the obvious technical requirements, the role also requires
extensive collaboration and communication with other
sysadmins. The systems that sysadmins work on can have
many components that cross boundaries between teams,
organizations, and expertise. Consequentially, their work
depends on establishing grounding [13], [17], [37], where
they form a common understanding of the behavior of a
system with other sysadmins. This is followed by a joint
understanding of who will do what work, when, and how
they will go about it. The grounding activity is vital be-
cause each sysadmin involved may have only a fractional
view of the system as well as access control limitations
on their potential actions. Grounding is necessary, partially
because sysadmin work represents a distributed cognitive
system [30], [47] where multiple members of a group work
together to complete a task as a single cognitive unit.
To illustrate these issues, Kandogan et al. [34, p.19-
49] provide a case study of a web admin, “George,”
attempting to set up a new server, but running into an
error. Notably, in George’s example, he has to commu-
nicate with many other sysadmins to solve the problem
partially because each sysadmin he contacts has a different
set of knowledge, view of the system, or access control
rights. The Firewall team, for example, has the ability
to change firewall settings which George’s server needs.
The software vendor knows about the weird intricacies
of their system that may not be in documentation. To
succeed, George must build an understanding of how
the system works (situational awareness) and facilitate
communication among the people helping him to build a
communal shared knowledge of the problem (information
broker).
Situational Awareness. Having a strong “sense of
their system” supports sysadmins engaging in trou-
bleshooting behaviors as it helps them pinpoint likely
sources of problems. Tools are also used to view the cur-
rent system status with sysadmins putting strong emphasis
on the accuracy, verification, reliability, and credibility of
tools they use [65], resulting in team members using very
different sets of tools in an effort to match their needs [63].
As systems grow in size, so do the challenges of
maintaining situational awareness. Hrebec and Stiber [29]
surveyed 54 sysadmins who reported, on average, a 77%
understanding of their systems. They also found that 86%
of respondents were self-taught. When asked how they
would troubleshoot for an issue they did not already know
how to solve, answers included: researching technical
documentation (23.58%), web, bulletin board systems, and
newsgroups (43.47%), and consultation with others with
experience (24.75%).
Information Brokers. The term “Technical Brokers”
was coined by Velasquez et al. [64] to highlight the role
sysadmins play in “translating” technical information and
knowledge into a digestible format for their organizations.
They found that sysadmins broker information between
end users, members of their technical community, and
the systems they work with. De Souza et al. [19], [20]
studied outsourcing organizations and similarly found that
sysadmins collect information from a range of sources
when solving problems, including: customers, customer
account brokers, and other employees who work with
customers. Similar to others, they also find a prominence
of communication and collaboration tools (e.g. instant
messenger etc.) to facilitate communication with 59.36%
stating they used these tools when dealing with incidents.
2.2. Security and Sysadmins
Sysadmins who focus on security tasks are often more
event driven, with a high focus on collaboration to help
spread the load of highly complex scenarios and asso-
ciated risks. Additionally, due to the rapid developing
nature of cyber-security, security admins have a steeper
learning curve [26], [33]. Kramer and Carayon [40] inter-
viewed 16 sysadmins (8 security admins and 8 network
admins) on the human and organizational factors related
to cyber-security, and analyzed the data using models of
human error and macro-ergonomics to interpret accidental
errors. They found that organizational factors were the
most prominent aspect. Other works have focused on
task specific usability issues or solutions, such as con-
figuration languages [21], [70], [71], the deployment of
HTTPS [41], and the diagnosing of security issues [16].
These results indicate that much work is still required to
make these tools, and process usable, with consideration
for the unique workload and flow required by sysadmins.
2.2.1. Updates and SysAdmins. Relatively little is
known about sysadmins’ needs and work practices around
software updating. Crameri et al. [18] surveyed 50 sysad-
mins as part of their development of Mirage, a distributed
framework for patch deployment. The survey found that
Figure 1: Number of times each OS was mentioned in list
emails per month.
90% of sysadmins applied patches once a month or more
to their systems, and reported security fixes as the main
purpose of applying updates. They also found that 70%
of sysadmins would avoid or delay updating if prob-
lems arose, and when asked to estimate the failure rate
of patches, the average was 8.6%. More recently, Li
et al. [44] conducted a survey of 102 sysadmins, and
performed a further 17 in-depth interviews to determine
their process, and its impact on patching effectiveness.
They found that information impacted patching decisions,
but there was no centralized hub of information, forcing
sysadmins to find information from a range of sources
including: official vendor notifications (71%), security
advisories (78%), professional mailing lists (54%), online
forums (53%), news (39%), and blogs (38%). The survey
also found that sysadmins continued to source information
through various means after installation, such as 55%
reporting that problematic updates were found through
end-users of clients complaints. In the post application
state where errors were present, the strategy used by
the majority of sysadmins was to uninstall the offending
update (47%) resulting in a functional but insecure system
state. Sysadmins then had to scramble to find workarounds
or fixes by themselves, or with software vendors.
2.3. End-Users and Updates
While sysadmins are generally aware of the link be-
tween updates and security, there is a lack of end-user
awareness as to the security critical nature afforded to
updates [22], [24], [48], [55], [61], [68]. This differ-
ence has been highlighted repeatedly, with IT security
experts rating software updates as an effective security
practice [31], [36], [56] while end users do not list [31].
It therefore comes as no surprise that end-users avoid or
delay updating, inadvertently increasing their vulnerability
time frame [23], [61]. Reasons for the circumventing
updates include annoying interruptions to users’ work-
flows [48], [66], [68], or confusing and unwelcome UI
alterations [11], [23], [61], [62].
3. Windows Update and Patch Tuesday
As mentioned previously, a large percentage of the
PatchManagement.org emails focus on Microsoft-related
patches (Figure 1) which are released in monthly cycles.
This focus on Microsoft makes sense as it is still the
most popular Operating System (OS), running on around
88.80% of all desktop platforms [54]. We give an overview
of Microsoft’s patching process to help the reader under-
stand the context the email list exists within.
Microsoft’s patching process has been through many
variations. Prior to Windows 98, patches were only posted
on a website where users could download them, but no
Microsoft-produced automated process existed for down-
loading and installing them. With the release of Windows
98, the Critical Update Notification Utility [50] was added
as a background process that would automatically check
the website for new “Critical” patches and notify the user
if they were found. In 2000, Windows ME shipped with
“Automatic Updates”, a tool that automatically checked
for patches, but only once the user had opted-in for the
feature. Windows XP SP2 changed the default settings
to automatically download and install patches with users
having the right to opt-out [68]. As a result of the defaults
change, Microsoft saw Windows XP patching rates jump
from 5% to 90% [25].
On the administration side, before Windows XP and
2000, there was no easy way to centrally deploy or
manage patching. Then, around 2003, Microsoft released
the Software Update Service (SUS) for Windows XP and
2000 [15]. SUS provided control and centralisation by
allowing administrators to run their own local “Windows
Update” servers which allowed them to select which
patches should and should not be deployed in their or-
ganisation. The Automatic Update software on the orga-
nization’s computers would then point at the local update
server and automatically install the sysadmin’s selected
patches. SUS was a powerful tool, but it still lacked many
crucial features, such as varying patching platform (i.e.
servers or desktop), which wouldn’t arrive until the re-
lease of SUS’s successor Windows Server Update Service
(WSUS) in late March 2005. Additionally, WSUS allowed
sysadmins to implement staged deployment of patches for
testing purposes before a full deployment.
Starting October 2003, all Microsoft product updates
are released on the second Tuesday of every month, un-
officially dubbed “Patch Tuesday”. On Patch Tuesday all
available patches are released at once between the hours
of 17:00 and 18:00 UTC, with related information such as
Knowledge Base (KB) articles following soon after. The
KB articles are important because they provide a unique
number for the patch as well as documentation such as
the update’s purpose, related system or platform, known
issues, and workarounds.
Historically, the second Tuesday was chosen as it was
theorized that it would allow sysadmins the full Monday
to fix any issues found in their system over the weekend,
before having to manage the updating process. The scale
and dominance of Patch Tuesday has resulted in some
companies piggybacking off of the model, with Adobe
also releasing their patches on the same day. Attackers
have also normalized to the cycle, with the next day
now unofficially called “Exploit Wednesday.” They also
download and analyze the patches, find changes the patch
makes (vulnerability locations), and then develop exploits
to target unpatched platforms.
Prior to Windows 10, patches were released separately
for each issue and sysadmins could select which patches
to install or not. With the release of Windows 10 Microsoft
switched to a cumulative updating model for all Windows
versions where each version of Windows theoretically re-
ceives only two patches each month: the cumulative patch
and the security-only patch. Installing the cumulative
patch installs all outstanding updates for the system for the
current month and prior months. Installing the security-
only update will only patch security issues for the current
month. Cumulative updates are potentially problematic
for security because they force sysadmins into an all-or-
nothing situation. Previously they could selectively block
patches that were having issues while installing the others,
but with the cumulative model, if any of the changes cause
problems, the whole patch must be blocked and they have
no option of installing non-problematic elements.
4. PatchManagement.org
PatchManagement.org, has been in existence since
December 2003, and is the first mailing list dedicated
to the topic of patch management. It was designed to
be used by network and sysadmins along with security
professionals to discuss the latest events and information
related to patching, with no restriction on vendor or oper-
ating system. It encourages discussion of a range of topics
including experiences with released patches, and “how-to”
questions regarding deployment or assessment of patches.
The list’s charter does have some restrictions on post
content. Most notably for this research, is the restriction of
announcements regarding vulnerabilities, unless they are
accompanied with a mitigation.
Moderation is provided by several key members of
the patching community, from whom we have received
consent to conduct community-respectful research using
the mailing archive. Furthermore, research we have pro-
duced is being shared with them to allow for feedback
and validation. The list is hosted by Ivanti, and the emails
posted through the mailing list are stored on MARCive
online. In April 2019, after data collected for this study
was completed, the list re-located to a Google Group.
4.1. List Data Collection
We scraped the PatchManagement.org mailing list
archive in April of 2019 using a custom Python script
to automatically download the emails from MARCive
and stored them and accompanying metadata in a secure
PostGreSQL database. We used the Beautiful Soup li-
brary [57], to strip HTML and extract the plain text. The
study design was certified by our ethics panel (#84622).
Sender emails were also processed to ensure that
multiple presentations of the same sender were linked
together. Host information was then extracted from email
addresses and used to determine the likely country of
origin and the sector using FortiGuard’s Web Filter [3].
Out of respect for the list community, we avoid any
discussion of specific organizations, and instead focus on
sector and region of the world to describe members.
4.2. List Demographics
We collected a total of 63,536 emails with send dates
ranging from December 2003 to April 2019. Figure 2
Figure 2: Total number of emails sent per month for the
whole history of the list.
Figure 3: Total number of emails sent per month in 2018.
shows the total numbers of emails sent per month for
the whole dataset, and Figure 3 shows emails sent only
in 2018. Both figures show the wide variation of month-
to-month email counts. Figure 2 also illustrates how the
list has shrunk and then grown over time, with the recent
up-tick in emails roughly corresponding to the increased
focus on patching as a preventative security practice as
well as the industry-wide shift towards making patching
automated [31], [61]. Taking a closer look at the most
recent complete year, 2018, Table 1 and Figure 2 show
that the number of overall emails are increasing, with a
slightly higher number of total emails, senders, and email
threads with no replies.
We searched the emails for Operating System names
(Windows, MacOS, Linux, iOS, and Android) to under-
stand their relative representation. Windows is by far the
most discussed operating system (Figure 1).
To understand the variety of organizations represented,
we looked at the host names of all 870 unique email
senders in 2018 along with their sector according to
FortiGuard. We identified a total of 670 unique email do-
mains, 94% of which were associated with only one email
address. In other words, most organizations represented
have only a single sysadmin engaged with this community.
We found a total of 24 unique country top level domains
from the UK, US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Eu-
rope, Asia, and South America. The top three sectors by
sender were: Business (n=191), Education (n=119), and
IT (n=110). Other notable sectors included: Government
and Legal Organisations (n=59), Health and Well-being
(n=62), Financial (n=60), and Private Domains (n=165)
which include email addresses such as @gmail.com and
# of 2018 All YearsAvg. Std. Dev. Max Min
Emails 7908 4075.93 2718.25 9538 1217
Senders 870 670.60 201.51 1200 476
No Reply 538 342.67 153.82 620 178
TABLE 1: Comparison between 2018 and other years (04-
18) in terms of the number of emails sent across the list,
the number of unique senders, and the number of emails
sent that had no reply.
@hotmail.com. In short, the list represents sysadmins
located world wide in a range of sectors.
5. Qualitative Coding Methodology
5.1. Codebook Design
Before creating the codebook, the two authors con-
ducting the qualitative analysis (AJ and PK) reviewed the
full content of 13 randomly selected threads from 2018,
comprising 106 emails in total. Based on this review, we
decided that similar to other work [32], the analysis would
focus only on the initial email of a thread. The content
of the full thread was interesting, but provided minimal
additional information about the reasons people engaged
with the list.
To create the codebook, two authors open coded [58,
p.100] the same 50 randomly selected initial thread emails
from throughout 2018 and individually created potential
codebook structures. They then met, discussed the ob-
served themes and created a combined codebook. One
interesting observation was the difference between emails
where the primary goal was information seeking versus
sharing. So the codebook explicitly had separate codes
based on the perceived intention of the email sender. Both
coders then individually applied the codebook to a new
random set of 50 emails, this time writing memos as they
went. Both the memos and results were reviewed and dis-
cussed resulting in a refinement of the codebook. Coding
conflicts were resolved within these sessions through con-
tinual discussion with issues reviewed until agreement was
reached. This process was repeated six more times (350
emails in total) before the coders felt they had sufficient
agreement and were no longer seeing new themes emerge
(saturation). Interrater agreement as measured by Cohen’s
Kappa was 0.88 (2 s.f.) for the last set of emails, which
is considered to be a very high level of agreement [49].
Table 2 details the codes present in the codebook along
with their descriptions.
5.2. Qualitative Coding
The codebook was applied to all emails sent from
the beginning of March to the end of July 2018. The
dates were chosen for three reasons. First, they are from
the most recent full year, 2018. Second, Meltdown and
Spectre, headline worthy vulnerabilities, were announced
in January 2018, so we selected a start date of two months
later to allow the list to return to a normal state. Third,
the chosen dates avoid major holidays that might impact
patch behavior.
A total of 380 initial thread emails were sent within the
chosen five months, representing 0.05% of all emails in
2018. The emails were then divided up with 45% given
to each coder. The remaining 10% were given to both
coders and placed at the end of their coding list. This
10% (n=38) overlap was used to measure the drift as the
two coders coded separately. The resulting κ=0.79 (2 s.f.)
shows a continued high-moderate agreement [49]. Of the
380 initial thread emails 24 were removed after coding as
they were deemed to not be initial thread emails.
6. Results
What follows is a discussion of the 356 initial thread
emails and the codes applied from our developed code-
book. Overall, there was a total of 188 information re-
quests, 150 examples of information sharing, and 18 off-
topic emails. We present the codes below by collecting
them into similar thematic areas, such as updates and er-
rors, and the associated tasks, such as troubleshooting. We
illustrate each code with examples edited for readability,
as well as the total number of emails coded from the final
set, and percentage. Table 2 has further statistics, including
total numbers of URLs shared, and KBs mentioned.
6.1. Patch Prioritization (n=76, 21.3%)
Two crucial activities after a patch is released are
learning about its release and, if there are multiple patches,
deciding which ones to prioritize [44]. This prioritization
includes understanding the changes the patch is likely to
make, risks of not patching (vulnerabilities), and likely
impacts on sysadmins’ systems. Similar to the related
work, we found that patch prioritization is a common
activity for list members.
6.1.1. Update Info (n=51, 14.3%). This code was pre-
dominantly related to the announcement of a patch’s
release, usually with URLs to the KB articles. Table 2
highlights URL usage with only 51 emails containing 287
KBs and 355 URLs. While the majority of content was
focused on Microsoft, announcements were made for a
range of products including Apple and Adobe. Announce-
ments included, re-releases or hotfixes, and even online
murmurs of a patch’s upcoming release. The sender would
provide URLs, and often quote important information
directly from the source along with any other observations,
as seen in the example below:
“[URL to MS Support Article KB4090913]
This update includes quality improvements. No
new operating system features are being intro-
duced in this update. Significant changes include
the following:
-Addresses issue where some USB devices and
onboard devices, such as a built-in laptop cam-
era, keyboard, or mouse, stop working. This may
occur when the Windows Update servicing stack
incorrectly skips installing the newer version of
some critical drivers in the cumulative update
and uninstalls the currently active drivers during
maintenance.
Theme Code Count % Thread Length Total countsMean Std. Dev. Max Min KB# URLs
Patch Prioritization Update Info 51 14.3 6.43 7.54 34 2 287 355Update Query 25 7.0 9.48 9.73 34 2 17 5
Errors and Troubleshooting
Update Error Info 46 12.9 7.93 8.71 42 2 45 46
Update Error Query 13 3.7 7.85 6.63 22 2 10 11
Patching Problems 86 24.2 9.29 8.25 36 2 69 22
Threats on the Radar Vulnerability and Attack Query 4 1.1 7.00 6.88 17 2 0 1Attack and Vulnerability Info. 12 3.4 5.50 2.91 10 2 1 16
How-to and Tools
Scenario/Situation Request 15 4.2 8.73 7.19 30 3 5 3
Tool Info. 19 5.3 6.16 4.57 16 2 0 21
Tool Query 29 8.1 7.69 7.56 37 2 3 4
Mechanics and Documentation Update Mechanism Query 14 3.9 5.21 3.07 12 2 123 122Update Mechanism Info. 12 3.4 8.00 8.82 33 2 8 16
Vendor Behaviour Windows MS Information 10 2.8 14.40 19.63 55 2 0 14Windows MS Query 2 0.6 5.50 4.95 9 2 0 0
Off Topic and Community
Community 7 2.0 11.14 10.90 32 2 0 5
List Info 3 0.8 5.67 3.21 8 2 0 1
List Query 3 0.8 9.00 5.29 15 5 0 0
Off Topic Info 5 1.4 4.60 3.21 9 2 0 52
TABLE 2: Codebook for initial emails with counts, percentage, thread length statistics, and counts of KBs and URLs
mentioned in the emails.
-Addresses issue where some devices
may fail to boot with ”INACCESSI-
BLE BOOT DEVICE”.
Release notes updated to reflect that this DOES
address the inaccessible boot device issue.”
On Patch Tuesday, external groups, such as GHacks,
system administrator subreddits, and AskWoody, create
lists of Microsoft patches with prioritization-related in-
formation such as: platforms impacted, severity of vul-
nerability, URLs to KB articles, and even an executive
summary with advice regarding the patches to prioritize
for that month. For example:
“...
Executive Summary
Security updates are available for all supported
versions of Windows (client and server). Other
Microsoft products with security updates are: In-
ternet Explorer, Microsoft Edge, Microsoft Ex-
change Server, PowerShell Core, Adobe Flash,
Microsoft Office. No critical vulnerabilities for
Windows versions but for Microsoft Edge and
Internet Explorer. Microsoft lifted the antivirus
compatibility check on Windows 10 version
1607, 1703 and 1709.
Operating System Distribution
• Windows 7: 21 vulnerabilities of which
21 are rated important
• Windows 8.1: 20 vulnerabilities of which
20 are rated important
• Windows 10 version 1607: 29 vulnerabil-
ities of which 29 are rated important
• Windows 10 version 1703: 28 vulnerabil-
ities of which 28 are rated important
• Windows 10 version 1709: 24 vulnerabil-
ities of which 24 are rated important
...”
6.1.2. Update Query (n=25, 7.0%). In this code, the
sender is looking for information about a particular patch
with the goal of gathering information as opposed to fixing
a problem. These emails are generally asking the commu-
nity for patch information not found in documentation or
asking for the community’s opinion about a patch.
For example, the below request asks if a particular
patch still exists. Patches can go in and out of circulation
as Microsoft removes and replaces error inducing patches
and the sender is uncertain if that is what they are seeing.
“Did Microsoft withdraw the 1709 July 10
CU? On endpoints with the July 10 SSU
(KB4339420) installed, WU is not offering the
July CU (KB4338825).”
In the next example, the sender points out the number
of side-effects of installing the patch, asks if installing it
is really worth it, and then subtly asks if anyone is aware
of an upcoming replacement patch with less side effects.
“I know this may be old news for some of you
but I generally wait a day or so before applying
patches. When I read about this patch and see
the known issues and workarounds -
[URL to MS Support Article KB4088878]
- is this patch really necessary? Looks like side
effects after taking a drug that will fix one thing
but make you suicidal. And when is Microsoft
going to provide this update...in a future release?
And we’re supposed to limp along?”
6.2. Errors and Troubleshooting (n=145, 40.8%)
The largest theme found in our dataset was focused on
the errors and troubleshooting caused by newly released
patches. Moreover, the mailing list attempts to keep track
of and announce any indications of updates causing prob-
lems that may have been observed elsewhere on the web.
Due to the cyclical nature of Patch Tuesday, each month
we would see the latest error trends. For example, March
and April had reoccurring issues with patches impacting
the Network Interface Controller (NIC). The community
was continually on the look out for information regarding
errors, and this could be sourced through citations to
blogs, or forums, or through the problems brought to
the list by community members. This citation behaviour
is shown through the count of KB Numbers, and URLs
found within this code, as seen in Table 2. These ini-
tial pieces of data would accumulate and eventually be
recognised by Microsoft, through official statements, and
proposed workarounds. These would then be fed back into
the community as a double confirmation of the issues.
6.2.1. Patching Problems (n=86, 24.2%). This code was
assigned to emails where the sender found themselves
in the debugging stage following the application of a
patch. The sender would be focused entirely on receiving
information that would explain and alleviate the symp-
toms of the offending patches. The majority of these
emails followed a very similar structure, in which the
sender would describe the observation they had made,
and the context in which it had appeared, such as in
testing environments or in production systems. The sender
would elaborate in great detail on the context of the error,
such as the system version, the deployment method, the
patches applied (usually referenced using KB number),
and even the work they had performed to work out what
was going on. This could take the form of scripts or
listing commands they had run. The sender would also
describe any online research they may have conducted,
often indicating reaching out on the list was their last
hope. For example:
“I patched my Dev/Test environment last night
and I have 6 servers that failed. I deployed
through SCCM, most of them showed an error
description of Software update execution time-
out. So, I changed the max run time on the up-
dates to 90 minutes. This morning, I ran manual
update scans on these servers, they all found and
downloaded the updates, but 6 of 8 failed again,
this time with an error code of 0x800705b4.
Looking this up, it refers to Windows Defender.
I found one article, saying to verify Windows
Defender service is running, which it is on all
of these servers
Is anyone else seeing this issue?”
The final call for any similar observation or
workarounds was another prominent feature of this code,
and was complimented by other senders who would refer
to older emails made in that month or previous, which had
similar error features to their own issues. For example,
“After a patch install on Wednesday night, we
saw about 6 virtual W2012R2 servers stuck at
the loading windows stage. The servers had
obviously tried to auto reboot, but didn’t come
back up properly. The VM’s had to be reset and
then came up normally - no NIC issues.
The patches installed were: KB4088876,
KB4089187, KB4088785 and KB4088879.
Nothing in the eventlog, known issues section
and I don’t remember seeing anything on this
list.
Anybody else seen boot issues on W2012R2?
I’m guessing it might be either KB4088876 or
KB4088879 (or both) but I have no evidence for
this.
...”
6.2.2. Update Error Query (n=13, 3.7%). We distin-
guished Update Error query from Patching Problems by
ensuring the sender did not explicitly state that they were
currently troubleshooting. Instead, the sender was request-
ing more information regarding rumors of errors discussed
elsewhere or by clients/ other colleagues. As seen here
where the sender lists errors they have observed:
“Please note this is not happening to all systems.
I have updated two home pcs to 1803 with no
issues
But am seeing forums and consultants starting
to report some issues. Wondering if anyone else
is seeing anything similarly and if so can you
email me directly so we can grab some log files?
1. Symptom: Desktop is unavailable
[URL to Windows10Forum Thread on ’Desktop
Unavailable’ Error]
[URLs to TomsHardWare Thread ’Desktop Un-
available’ on Error] ...
It looks like this: [URL to Twitter, Picture of
Error]
2. Roll back loop [URL to Reddit Thread on
Windows 10 Roll Back Loop Error]
...”
Senders would ask if community members had any
further information pertinent to the described bug. The
focus was on actionable intelligence, such as workarounds
or contextual triggers for bugs, like the offending patch
and the applications it interfered with. Asking the com-
munity for this information allowed the the sender to
perform a risk analysis, as to whether the known issue
was anything they would have to worry about in their
patching strategies.
“[URL to MS Support Article KB4103718]
For those of you that did suffer a loss of net-
working after the May updates, what exact nic
card did you have?
What brand of computer?”
6.2.3. Update Error Info (n=46, 12.9%). Here the
sender shares information regarding the existence of po-
tential errors found in that month’s batch of patches.
This information could take the form of forum thread
discussion of problems, to news or blog articles detailing
problematic patches. Often, these URLs could also be
sourced from other online communities (Technet, MS An-
swers, Reddit, Twitter, etc.), or the patch documentation.
For example:
“I just wanted to pass this along and wondered
If anyone else has come across this issue yet..?
We haven’t but apparently many others are now:
[URL to Reddit Thread on Error following July
Updates] ”
Data could also come directly from the sender’s sys-
tem, however they would not explicitly ask for help trou-
bleshooting. Their intention was to make the community
aware of a problematic patch, as they may have already
raised the issue with Microsoft, or had simply uninstalled
the patch. For example:
“We are running Office Professional 2016 64bit
(msi install) on Windows 10 Enterprise v.1703
and encountered the Word has stopped error
when double clicking a Word file in File Ex-
plorer to open it. You can start Word and open
files within Word without the issue.
...
Uninstalling the patch resolved the issue”
If available, they would hint at a possible workaround
or suggested mitigation strategies for the errors. If this was
not available, the sender would often ask for thoughts, or
if anyone else had first hand experience with this issue.
6.3. How-To and Tools (n=63, 17.7%)
We observed that senders were seeking the advice and
suggestions from the community for a range of patching
related tasks. These codes appeared to be eliciting the
experiences of the community to inform their current
process, or to aid with proposed future changes. For
example, we saw situations in which the sender was
seeking the recommendations of tools for a given task,
such as Automatic Deployment Rules (ADR), or asking
for for PowerShell scripts that were shared amongst the
community. Asking the community for these recommen-
dations, or experiences, allows community members to
better understand, and develop their systems and patching
process.
6.3.1. Scenario/Situation Request (n=15, 4.2%). In this
code, the sender would set out a patching scenario, or a
situation they needed guidance on. Senders would give
future planned changes to their systems, or their current
set-up, and look for suggested plans, or the thoughts of
the community. For example:
“We are setting up a WSUS server for Windows
10 systems. The current plan is to limit access to
only new or upgraded devices so the old system
can sunset with older systems. This should also
help with the different management styles of the
newer OS, and the storage requirements.
How would you manage this transition?”
Sender’s may also enquire about how community
members tackle certain aspects of patch management,
such as system upgrades, updating portable machines, or
getting to grips with monitoring patching levels. Senders
were looking to elicit the experiences of list members, and
to gain from the knowledge of others. For example:
“While we have the majority of our systems in-
house, there are a handful of portable machines
that leave our LAN frequently. Currently uti-
lizing WSUS for internal machines with a GPO
pointing towards it for both reporting and update
feed. On the portable machines however I set
a GPO for them to download from Microsoft
directly since they are usually not here. Problem
is, there are a few patches that we either do not
want installed, or Microsoft can’t figure out how
to get them to work properly which I would
like to filter out. Just wanting to get some pros
and cons of which way or another you all have
experienced.”
Given the scale of Microsoft, gaining from the knowl-
edge of others is highly valuable, and allows sysadmins
the opportunity to avoid pitfalls and follow in the steps of
those with more experience.
6.3.2. Tool Info (n=19, 5.3%). Here the sender would
share the announcement of a tool, service, or script, which
they deemed potentially useful in the patching process. We
did not include direct discussion of patches for tools in this
code, and instead only considered examples where new
features or announcements of intended products pushed a
sender to share with the community. For example,
“WAC or Windows Admin Center creates a
new method for managing PC’s for help desk
functions. Update management is included in
this. Have any of you tested this? It looks like it
is only compatible with Chrome and Edge and
2012 and newer OS. Oh, and it doesn’t replace
RSAT or MMC completely.
[URL to Microsoft Cloudblogs WAC Announce-
ment]”
It could also take the form of settings and tricks that
a sender had found, and was willing to share with the
community.
“I’m in the middle of creating a reference image
for 1709 and have found a way of disabling the
silently installed apps and removing the associ-
ated tiles from start. These changes need to be
applied to the ntuser.dat in C:/users/default. It
may help someone:
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\defuser
\Software\Microsoft\Windows
\CurrentVersion\Conte$\DeliveryManager]
"FeatureManagementEnabled"=dword:00000000
"OemPreInstalledAppsEnabled"=dword:00000000 ...”
6.3.3. Tool Query (n=29, 8.1%). Here, a sender would
pose a question regarding a tool, software (SCCM, Con-
figMgr), or script related to an element of patching. This
could take the form of feedback regarding a particular tool,
or looking for suggestions of an alternative. It should be
noted that this code was not limited to only Microsoft
products, as a number of third party software and vendors
were routinely discussed. The sender would often detail
the intricacies of their systems and indicate exactly what
they wished the tool to do. For example:
“Can anyone recommend an alternative to
Ivanti/Shavlik for a small business (just 12 li-
cences). We’ve been very happy with it since the
days of hfnetchk, but it seems neither the reseller
or Ivanti themselves want our business any more
- must be too small - so we’re looking for
an alternative. Ideally agentless and cost effec-
tive without too much admin input or scripting.
Can’t use an MS offering as we have moved
away from Windows servers, so it needs to run
on a workstation and not need AD.”
Alternatively, the code contained examples where
senders were working out errors, or best practices with
the tool in question. For example:
“I currently use Automatic Deployment Rules
in SCCM to deploy and manage Windows up-
dates/patches. In the event that an emergency
patch is released to the WU que, how do I push
this update through. My current ADR is set to
run each patch Tuesday with a deadline of 7
days after.”
6.4. Threats on the Radar (n=16, 4.5%)
SysAdmins must be constantly vigilant for new, and
potentially devastating vulnerabilities that could impact in
their systems. Being aware of these issues will allow them
to plan their patching accordingly, as well as mitigate
the risks of yet unpatched vulnerabilities. Cyber Security
is constantly adapting as new vulnerabilities are found
everyday, and hence the community attempts to remain
current through their information collaboration. As with
previous themes, there were popular topics discussed, such
as fallout from the Meltdown and Spectre patches released
earlier in the year (but not released within our cho-
sen window). Clarification would be sought on whether
vulnerabilities had been plugged following the released
patches, or if there was potentially more needing to be
done to prevent successful attacks on their systems.
6.4.1. Attack and Vulnerability Info (n=12, 3.4%). This
code captured information shared regarding the existence
of a newly discovered vulnerability or attack in the wild.
This could include the announcement of a new vulnera-
bility, for example:
“Another Spectre/Meltdown type vuln.
[URL to US-Cert Alert (TA18-141A)]
[URL to Verge Article on CPU Vulnerability]”
It could also include discussion of the emergence of
attacks, and proof of concept code, such as:
“In the past 12 hours, ”XPN” has released and
updated exploit code for Total Meltdown.
[URL to XpnSec Blog on Meltdown]
Kevin Beaumont has confirmed that it works.
[URL to Twitter Post]
Win7 and Server 2008R2 systems are left with
few options.
[URL to Ask Woody Meltdown Post]”
6.4.2. Vulnerability and Attack Query (n=4, 1.1%).
Senders would ask the community for information regard-
ing known vulnerabilities or new attacks in the wild. These
requests were linked to some observations, such as news
articles or blogs, that spur them to enquire further. This
could also take the form of an observation made about
their system, as they seek a verification from the list.
Senders would often ask for clarification regarding the
technicalities of the vulnerability, or the best mitigation
strategies. For example:
“Just when it seemed like 2018 couldn’t get any
worse for IT, does anyone have information re:
this threat?
Googling vpnfilter will source several reliable
resources that this is a legit threat.
Based on my reviews of available information
I’m not sure at this point just how the stage1
succeeds. If a device does not have remote
management enabled that should address this
problem - unless there is a flaw that is being
exploited on the device itself.
Can anyone comment on how the exploit suc-
ceeds and what if any are the mitigating factors?
Particular to this new headache it would seem
worth asking what devices out of the box allow
for remote access? None that I know of or have
worked with.”
6.5. Mechanics and Documentation (n=26, 7.3%)
Patching is a complicated business with multiple
sources of information, with documentation, and defini-
tions of vendor terminology. However, due to the scale,
and complexity of updates, community members would
find themselves confused around terminology and their
real-world impact, i.e. how patches actually worked. In-
consistencies in documentation would result in senders
looking to the community for reassurance or clarification
regarding terms, and the mechanics of patching mecha-
nisms like WSUS, or how different branches of releases
were delivered. These codes would contain URLs to
the offending documentation, with a total of 138 found
within this theme. Understanding the documentation, and
therefore how patches were intended to work, is vital
to a successful patching schedule. Given the scope of
Microsoft, we can see that mistakes in clarity are possible.
6.5.1. Update Mechanism Info (n=12, 3.4%). Windows
Update Service adapts with time, with changes being
made to the inner workings of both patches and patching
services. Information sourced in this code could include
blog posts made by specific teams within Microsoft, as
senders keep the list aware of intended changes to the
patching landscape:
“Office 365 is changing its build numbers to a
five-digit format.
[URL to MS Support Article on Office 365
Changing Build number Format]”
Community members would also monitor discussions
found on the list, and be compelled to correct or direct
the list to sources which would explain patch mechanics:
“I’ve seen several list members recently noting
that computers with settings to the contrary are
being forced to 1709. Please see KB4023814,
particularly this paragraph:
‘Windows 10 version 1607 and version 1703 are
not yet at ’end of service.’ However, they must
be updated to the latest versions of Windows
10 to ensure protection from the latest security
threats.’
Woody wrote a piece yesterday on Computer-
world saying the telemetry level setting is also
a factor on who gets the forced upgrade.
[URL to ComputerWorld Article on Telemetry
Settings]
We’re a SMB, Microsoft does not care what I
think. But to those of you that have lots of seats
and TAMs, is this acceptable to you? It seems
unconscionable to me that you follow all Mi-
crosoft’s latest rules for reg settings and group
policy to defer updates, and despite running a
version of Windows that had not yet reached
EOL, they update you anyway.”
6.5.2. Update Mechanism Query (n=14, 3.9%). We
found that changes or subtle inconsistencies in the word-
ing surrounding the description of technical aspects of
documentation and patches would cause senders to look
for clarification. Patching is extremely detail orientated,
therefore anything which did not fit into the sender’s
mental map of how patches are constructed, applied, or
delivered, would cause them to reach out to the commu-
nity to verify. For example:
“If I go here: [URL to Microsoft Windows 10
Release Information]
I see Semi-Annual Channel (Targeted) is 1709
and Semi-Annual Channel is 1803. This seems
backwards to my understanding of those terms.
Am I missing something?”
Update mechanisms also captured misunderstandings
regarding how patch delivery mechanism worked and what
terminology meant in patching scenarios. As seen here:
“We are looking at upgrading our Windows 10
fleet and yes we do have a mix bag from 1511
to 1803. We use Configuration Manager 1710
with WSUS.
Windows 10 1511 is now out of support as we
all know, does that mean we cannot upgrade the
1511 (and even 1607) Windows 10 to 1803 via
WSUS? I think the answer is yes, and wanted
to check with the experts as I am sure we are
not the only company that lets say a little slow
to the Windows 10 upgrade party.
Let me know if you need any more information
and thanks in advanced”
6.6. Vendor Behaviour (n=12, 3.4%)
We observed information regarding Microsoft as a
company, its direction, or its policies related to patching.
As a sysadmin, one must navigate the relationship with
the vendor, as press statements and announcements of
intent are indicators of potential shifts and alterations in
the patching landscape. Keeping aware of company an-
nouncements and internal changes is useful as it allows for
anticipation of the changes as opposed to being caught in
the cold. We found that these discussions would routinely
cover what was believed to be inadequate responses of
Microsoft, with many using these to justify their beliefs
and patching strategies. The responses were overwhelm-
ingly negative, and it was clear in our community that
Microsoft is not seen as a communicative partner. For
example, through our error codes we saw passing remarks
regarding the state of Microsoft’s testing of patches, with
some stating, “Do they even test these?!”
6.6.1. Windows/Microsoft Info (n=10, 2.8%). This code
captured the sharing of information regarding the be-
haviour of Microsoft. Announcements made by Microsoft
and were regularly found to be unsatisfactory. The sender
would react negatively to a decision or response from
Microsoft, and would appear to vent regarding the “dis-
regard” Microsoft was showing towards them and other
admins. For example:
“[URL to MS TechCommunity Windows 10
Ask Me Anything]
IMHO the question really wasn’t answered.
So if you were in charge of patching/servicing
and testing at Microsoft, how would you gain
back the trust?”
Senders would often point to decisions being made,
and often use them to justify their stance on certain
patching services, as seen here:
“Here is a reason to not deploy LTSB:
[URL to MS TechCommunity Windows 10 Ask
Me Anything - LTSB for Pro Users]
We’ve recently announced that Office will no
longer be supported on LTSC in the future
(today, it is still supported on certain LTSC
versions). So please keep this in mind. Here’s
the blog with that announcement:
[URL to MS Technet Blogs on Windows IT Pro,
Changes to Office and Windows]
...”
6.6.2. Windows/Microsoft Query (n=2, 0,6%). In this
code, the sender would reach out to the community
for clarification regarding the actions of Microsoft as a
company or Windows as a service. These queries would
often follow from announcements or observations made
regrading adjustments made to update services or related
products. More often than not, senders would be angry or
upset with the proposed change, often the discontinuation
of a product used in patching. Those affected are pushed
to reach out the community, to create a discussion as to
why Microsoft will have made this decision. For Example:
“Talking to an engineer about Bitlocker and he
asked why I don’t have an Azure presence yet?
I say I don’t need one. He says you do know
you will be required to have one in the very
near future. I scratch my head. Is this truly the
path Microsoft is taking and will I be required
to have an AD-Azure presence even if I don’t
want one?
I’ll sit back and read your replies.”
6.7. Off-Topic, List Rules, and Community (n=18,
5.0%)
The community is clearly a trove of data on patching
related issues. However, we observed examples of emails
that were not directly patching related, and were consid-
ered off-topic, list information, or community related.
6.7.1. List Info (n=3, 0.8%) and List Query (n=3,
0.8%). These two codes captured emails which informed
community members of the rules and running of the mail-
ing list, with List Info focused on sharing this information.
This could include moderators stating they would be away
for a while, or GDPR’s affect on the list, as seen here:
“Since
a. this list is voluntary
b. this list is not selling anything
c. this list is not selling email addresses
d. it is merely a peer resource
Therefore this list is not covered by GDPR rules
and thus does not need to ask everyone from the
EU to re-opt back in.”
The opposing code, List Query, captured queries re-
garding what was appropriate content for the list, such as
the example below:
“Am I mistaken to say that this list primarily
refers to servers? I work in the desktop envi-
ronment and follow this list to help determine
what to release.”
6.7.2. Off Topic Info (n=5, 1,4%). Not all emails coded
were directly related to patching or the patching cycle,
but could still be replated in some way. For example, we
saw the list share tools or information regarding sysadmin
tasks, such as Amazon Web Services (AWS), seen here:
“For those on AWS – [URL to Github Hammer
Project]
[URL to Medium article on Dow Jones Hammer
Tool]
Today, Dow Jones Tech is pleased to open
source Dow Jones Hammer, a DevSecOps tool
that lets you identify and proactively fix mis-
configurations in cloud workloads.
...”
Moreover, we saw examples of information source
sharing, which took the form of members posting their
go-to Twitter followers:
“Hi Folks,
This is me and my Twitter Following List.
Microsoft People
[List of 10 Twitter Accounts]
Microsoft
docs.microsoft.comVerified @docsmsft
The PowerShell Team @PowerShellT eam
Windows InsiderVerified @windowsinsider
.NET Foundation @dotnetfdn
Visual Studio Team ServicesVerified @V STS
.NET TeamVerified @dotnet
Windows Defender Security Intelligence
@WDSecurity
Microsoft SecureVerified @msftsecurity
Security ResponseVerified @msftsecresponse
Microsoft SupportVerified MicrosoftHelps
MicrosoftVerified @Microsoft
MS Windows IT ProVerified
@MSWindowsITPro
Microsoft NewsVerified @MSFTnews
WindowsVerified @Windows
Microsoft Channel 9Verified @ch9
Media, NetCasters & Others
[List of 22 Twitter Accounts]
...”
6.7.3. Community (n=7, 2.0%). This code captures the
camaraderie shown amongst list members, primarily in the
form of thanks, or appreciation to the list for its help.
“I just want to give a HUGE **THANK YOU**
to everyone in this group for helping me *SO*
much over the last years. The information pro-
vided here is invaluable, and the time and effort
everyone takes to submit and SHARE informa-
tion is, well breathtaking. I’ve learned SO much
and appreciated folks stepping up and answering
my (sometimes neophyte) questions
As it turns out, it’s time for me to ride off into
the sunset and enjoy retirement. ...
It has truly been my honor being part of such a
magnificent group.”
Thanks were the most common example, but we also
found emails that were part of community wide efforts,
such as a list moderator thanking the community for help
in the writing of an open letter to Microsoft [43].
“[URL to Computer World article on Open Let-
ter to Microsoft]
My deepest thanks to all who participated.
Bottom line the fight for change has just begun.”
7. Limitations
In our analysis we look at a single online community
focused on the topic of patch management. We selected
this community due to its age and popularity; however, it
is only one of many similar online communities discussing
this topic. Both Reddit’s r/sysadmin subreddit and the
Microsoft official TechNet forums also contain discussions
of patch management. All such communities have their
own norms, values, and methods of interaction and may
also exhibit different platforms of focus, such as Linux.
We believe that many of our findings will generalize to
other groups, but without exploring them we cannot know
that for certain. Similarly, we only study people who
contributed to the list within our time frame. People who
are engaged through reading, but not contributing, are not
well represented in our work. Additionally, due to the list’s
focus on Microsoft, we have only been able to analyze
the patching information regarding this particular vendor.
Although this is a large and important software vendor, the
information provided and delivery of patches will differ
across other vendors and therefore our results will have
limited generalizability
In our analysis we also chose to only focus on the first
email in threads. We believe that doing so allowed us to
get a good overview of the purposes people have when
interacting with the list, a method which has also been
successfully used by others [32]. However, it also limited
our exploration. It is very possible that some threads
contained changes in topic mid-thread.
Finally, our analysis was constrained to a five month
period in 2018. The number and type of communications
across the list are heavily impacted by the number and
severity of patches released in a given month. So it is quite
likely that if we selected a different set of months, such as
January when Meltdown was announced, we would have
found slightly different themes and a different balance of
topics. We also have some evidence that the list has several
long-running email threads, some of which go back years.
By limiting to thread starting emails within these five
months we excluded these long running threads from the
analysis. Having reviewed several such threads, we feel
that the impact was minimal, but it was still present.
8. Discussion
8.1. Online Community of Practice
The themes uncovered during our analysis suggest that
the mailing list PatchManagement.org lends itself well to
being studied through the lens of Communities of Practice
(CoP). CoP is a concept that emerged from the social
theory of learning proposed by Lave and Wenger [42], and
was further developed in 1998 by Wenger [69]. Kandogan
et al. [34] have already identified the important role that
social learning plays for system administrators.
Essentially, in a COP, a group of people who share a
craft or profession build a community where members can
share information and experiences as well as learn from
each other. CoP’s can either form naturally or be explicitly
created and grow through the discussions of community
members around topics such as best practices. A CoP can
also be virtual [5]. A COP has three key characteristics:
• Domain - a body of knowledge which allows for
mutual understanding amongst the members of the
community, and guides the learning and goals of
the community;
• Community - a community feeling provides the
social framework for learning. A strong and ac-
cepting community fosters discussions and encour-
ages further learning opportunities; and
• Practice - the members of the community are
practitioners in the domain, therefore through their
social interactions they gain an insight into best
practices for their chosen domain.
The domain of PatchManagement.org is software
patches – release, intended and unintended side effects,
and mitigation of problems introduced by the patches.
Members are mostly sysadmins, and therefore practition-
ers in the domain – part of their role is to apply patches
in a way that is both timely and minimally disruptive.
Our qualitative analysis, in particular the smaller themes,
clearly demonstrate that the mailing list also has the third
element of community. There are well enforced rules
that allow list members to debate the advantages and
disadvantages of each patch openly.
8.2. Tasks are Highly Complex and High Risk
Typical of contexts that generate Communities of
Practice, patch management is a highly complex task. It
requires sysadmins to manage potentially large networks
of computers, each of which have a different set of
requirements and setups. Then, with the release of each
patch, they must balance the risks and benefits of installing
it [10], not just globally but on each computer or set of
computers. The information that sysadmins have at release
is skewed and incomplete. They know what issues the
patch is supposed to fix, but not what new issues the patch
is likely to cause across the entire network. Therefore, they
need a way of monitoring emerging issues for data that
they can use in their own decision processes.
The online CoP of PatchManagement.org is a safe
space where sysadmins can access up to date information
and obtain expert advice on their decisions, as shown in
the themes of Errors and Troubleshooting, and How-To
and Tools.
Since sysadmins may be isolated in their own com-
panies or work in very small teams, it is invaluable to
have access to the “wisdom of the crowd” when it comes
to a high risk activity such as patch management. Errors,
such as installing a buggy patch, or not installing a patch
for a security vulnerability that is then exploited, can
take large numbers of computers that are vital to the
functioning of an organization offline very quickly [52].
Often it is not possible to mitigate all the associated risks,
so instead sysadmins must manage their risk appetite and
decide how much and what type of risks they will take.
The open discussion of questions such as how quickly
a patch should be deployed, or whether difficult-to-patch
computers should be protected behind a firewall, help the
community come to a consensus on what best practice
mitigations are “enough”.
8.3. Time Pressures Require Prioritisation of
Work
Looking more specifically at the monthly patch cycle,
one large source of complexity is the time pressure to get
patches installed quickly [10], [12]. Most official guidance
on patching, such as the UK’s Cyber Essentials [1], rec-
ommends installing patches as soon as possible to avoid
potential compromise. Practically, however, installing all
patches at once is not possible as each patch should be
tested and then deployed. Some months as many as 60+
patches can be released by Microsoft alone in one day. To
handle the overload, sysadmins use available information
to prioritize patches that have serious security implications
over those that do not [44].
We saw evidence of the PatchManagement.org com-
munity openly discussing what patches needed to be pri-
oritised and which could or should be delayed. The com-
munity’s wisdom was drawn upon to prioritise not only
the patches themselves, but how severe the vulnerabilities
they impacted were and what systems would be impacted.
8.4. Verification is Hard to Impossible
Verifying that a patch is “safe” or “working” is a
challenging (and occasionally impossible) problem par-
tially because there is no good definition of “safe” or
“working” [35]. After installation, sysadmins “test” the
patch by doing everything from observing a lack of errors,
conducting basic actions like opening email, deploying
it to beta testers, or running a full battery of automated
tests on a dedicated testing environment. However, these
activities do not produce definitive proof that the patch
is good, just that no errors have been found, therefore
the decision to move to production systems is always a
gamble.
Patch failures can also have several sources beyond
the patch itself. The purpose of a patch is to change how
software works, that change can then have side effects for
other software or react badly to specific configurations [34,
ch3]. As a result, when a patch is seen to fail, the first
question is what and/or who is the cause rather than
assuming the patch itself is problematic.
The PatchManagement.org community actively shared
information about observed and potential patch problems.
The list allowed members to collect together information
they found across the Internet to bring together a picture
of what patches were causing issues drawn not only from
their local experience, but also from those of other related
communities. For members who were currently struggling
with post-patch issues, the list offered a place to openly
discuss the problem and gain not only solutions but also
learning about how systems like Windows work.
8.5. Fixing Requires Evidence
Getting problematic patches fixed can also be difficult.
There are many possible sources of issues beyond the
patch itself. So getting a vendor, such as Microsoft, to
fix the patch requires providing evidence that the problem
being observed is really caused by the patch and not
something else.
In this regard, the list served as a collective method
of contacting vendors and a source of multiple cases to
provide to the vendors as evidence. When a problem was
identified, list members would comment that they “had
a ticket with Microsoft” and promised to report back to
the list with the response. Some members had elevated
Microsoft Support contracts and could use them to get
better support which was then passed on to the list.
9. Conclusion
We conducted a qualitative analysis of 356 emails
shared on the patch orientated mailing list PatchManage-
ment.org with a focus on Windows Update. We found that
the list is used for sharing information critical to the patch-
ing process such as identifying critical patches, and also
for help seeking when in a troubleshooting state following
patch application. Moreover, we found that this list also
deals with queries related to the practice of patching, and
allows for clarification on inconsistent documentation and
terminologies. We believe that this Online Community of
Practice alleviates the difficulties found when dealing with
the uncertainties of patching, by providing the expertise
of others it can direct sysadmins towards best practices,
or tools. Furthermore, we argue that these communities of
practice provide a source for learning the best practices
in an uncertain patching landscape.
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